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Economic and Social Rights in the United States:
An Overview of the Domestic Legal Framework
by Je s s i ca Sch u ltz

D

to civil liberties, the
United States government is conspicuously reluctant to re cognize economic and social rights (ESR) within its own
borders. This article explores legal avenues available to pursue ESR claims in the absence of explicit Constitutional guarantees. The
purpose is twofold: first, by framing U.S. cases in the context of international law, the article highlights opportunities to bring domestic jurisprudence in line with well-established human rights standards. Second, the
U.S. domestic experience can be instru c t i ve for advocates in other countries who are struggling to overcome similar obstacles to the recognition
of ESR.
The framew o rk of legal obligations under international human
rights instruments provides a useful device for organizing domestic ESR
strategies. Under international law, governments are obliged to respect,
protect and fulfill the human rights of those within their borders. This
means that the government must refrain from encroaching upon people's
existing rights (respect); it must protect people from violations by third
p a rties (protect); and finally it must establish political, economic and
social systems that provide eve ryone access to the guaranteed right (fulfill). Running through these three levels of obligations are the overarc hing human rights principles of non-discrimination and p rogressive realiza tion. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) prohibits discrimination in access to ESR on the
g rounds of “race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Progressive re a lization obliges a government to fulfill ESR “to the maximum of available
resources”. This means that they must not pursue policies that either
deprive people of the most basic element of each right (“the minimum
core content”), or actually decrease people's access to a right (“the principle of non-retrogression”). In the following sections, the article examines
U.S. caselaw through the lens of these obligations.
There are numerous avenues available to pursue ESR under domestic law - this article focuses on three. First, nearly eve ry state constitution
guarantees an adequate education, and a few state courts have recognized
other rights implied by general welfare provisions. Second, advocates can
anchor their claims on Equal Protection guarantees, as well as federal,
state and local anti-discrimination laws. Finally, the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution can be used to
pre vent rollbacks in social benefits.
ESPITE ITS STRONG COMMITMENT

DEFENDING ESR UNDER THE RUBRIC
OF NON-DISCRIMINATION
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS IN THE U.S. can be used to address
both access to and adequacy of ESR. These laws include the equal protection clauses of federal and state constitutions, and federal, state and
local statutes. The rights to education, work, and shelter have been litigated extensively through anti-discrimination actions.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution
limit the power of the government to discriminate against members of
c e rtain groups. The Fo u rteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
provides that: “No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The Supreme Court has interpre ted this protection to apply to the federal government as well, through the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.

In interpreting equal protection, howe ve r, the Supreme Court does
not consider differential treatment is not discriminatory per se. Rather, to
establish discrimination where a law is neutral on its face, a victim must
prove both impact and purpose. That is, the law must have a dispro p o rtionate or disparate effect on the group to which the victim belongs, and
the state must have enacted the law with such effect intentionally in
mind. This is one point of departure from international law, which prohibits treatment that has either d i s c r i m i n a t o rypurpose or effect.
The Court has fashioned a series of tests to determine the constitutionality of laws that explicitly distinguish between various protected categories of individuals. Depending on the classification involved, the
C o u rt reviews state action according to one of three standards of judicial
scrutiny. If a law or practice discriminates on the basis of race, citizenship
or national origin, or if it burdens the exercise of a “fundamental” right,
a “strict scrutiny” standard applies. The state must demonstrate that the
challenged classification is justified by a compelling government interest
and is “narrowly tailored” to further that interest. If the law or practice
explicitly discriminates on the basis of gender or legitimacy, the Court
applies an “intermediate” standard of re v i ew, where a classification must
s e rve “important governmental objectives” and must be “substantially
re l a t e d” to the achievement of those objectives. Finally, other “non-suspect” classifications are generally upheld as long as the State demonstrates
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a “rational basis” for making its distinction. In areas of social and economic policy, “a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld
against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”
Whereas U.S. courts re q u i re more than a “rational basis” to justify
explicit distinctions only on the basis of race, citizenship, national origin,
gender and legitimacy, Article 2 of the ICESCR bans discrimination “of
any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, pro p e rty, birth or other status” (emphasis
added). This definition prohibits any distinction that impairs a person's
e xe rcise of his or her rights. The Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ESCR Committee) has found discrimination in various
domestic laws that make distinctions on the basis of age, health status
and disability.
Because the people most affected by social and economic rights violations frequently do belong to a “suspect category” under the equal protection clause, constitutional claims are commonly invoked to enforc e
social and economic rights such as the right to education and shelter. In
Brown vs. the Board of Education, for example, the Supreme Court relied
on the Equal Protection Clause to hold that a racially segregated public
school system was unconstitutional. . Even if the quality of tangible factors like curriculum, teachers and facilities was comparable in all-black
and all-white schools, the Court found that racial separation generated a
sense of inferiority that inevitably impaired their ability to learn: “[t]o
separated them from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
e ver to be undone.”

Protection Clause to argue that education was a “fundamental right” and
that policies which resulted in per-pupil spending disparities infringed
upon that right. Courts applied strict scrutiny analysis to examine those
policies. In 1973, howe ve r, the Supreme Court ended its strict scru t i n y
approach cases with its decision in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, which held that wealth is not a suspect classification
for the purpose of equal protection review, and that education is not a
fundamental right. Between 1973 and 1979, advocates attacked unfair
school finance systems with the equal protection and education clauses
in state constitutions. This strategy had mixed success because it was difficult to distinguish spending from other variables that impact educational opportunity. Ad vocates finally abandoned reliance on equal protection
arguments in favor of an approach focusing on the adequacy of education.

Protestors in the United States demand broader assistance for the poor.
Credit: Ha rvey Finkle

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION STATUTES
ESR advocates can also refer to anti-discrimination measures in
federal, state and local statutes. The Fourteenth Amendment provides
Congress with the power to pass any laws necessary for its enforcement.
Because the Amendment was originally interpreted to cover only gove r nment action, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to reach
individuals who discriminate against others on the basis of race, color,
religion or national origin. This extension coincides with the ESCR
Committee's interpretation of the principle of non-discrimination to
cover acts by both public authorities and by private individuals. It is also
consistent with states' obligation to pre vent third parties from encro a c hing on individual rights. Titles VI and VII of the Act specifically prohibit discrimination in federally funded programs (Title VI) and in the
w o rkplace if the employer is engaged in interstate commerce (Title VII).
In certain situations, federal, state and local anti-discrimination
statutes provide protection to groups outside the traditional suspect classes. The Fair Housing Act, for example, prohibits discrimination based on
race, religion, national origin, sex, familial status or disability. Some state
laws prohibit discrimination based on grounds linked to pove rt y. In New
Jersey, the legislature enacted a statute that prohibits landowners fro m
refusing to rent or lease a house or apartment based on the prospective
tenant's source of lawful income.

Three cases in particular illustrate how the right to education has
been defined over the past decade in state courts: Edgewood Independent
School District v. Kirby (Edgewood), Rose v. Council for Better Education
(Rose), and Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York (CFE). The Edgewood
case, decided in 1989, was one of the first cases to use an “adequacy”
rather than “equity” argument to challenge school finance systems. The
Texas Supreme Court found that the state's pro p e rty tax-based system for
financing public education violated the state constitution. Article VII,
Section 1 of the Texas constitution declares that “a general diffusion of
knowledge” is “essential to the pre s e rvation of the liberties and rights of
the people”. To that end, the section states that “it shall be the duty of the
Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the
s u p p o rtand maintenance of an efficient system of free schools.”
The court held that “efficient” conveys the meaning of effective or
“productive of results” as well as the economical use of resources. It found
that “[t]he present system provides not for a diffusion that is general, but
for one that is limited and unbalanced. The resultant inequalities are thus
directly contrary to the constitutional vision of efficiency.” In particular,
the court noted that while efficiency does not re q u i re a per capita distribution, there must be direct and close correlation between a district's tax
effort and the education resources available to it. T h roughout Texas, the
tax burden and money raised varied dramatically, with the wealthiest
areas enjoying both dispro p o rtionately low taxes and well-resourced
schools. Rather than ordering a specific remedy or requiring the legislature to raise taxes, the court set a time limit for the legislature to develop
a new financing system.
Also in 1989, the Supreme Court of Kentucky had the opport u n ity to examine its own constitutional mandate to provide an “efficient sys-

FULFILLMENT OF ESR AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
TO THE EXTENT THAT SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS IN THE U.S. are re cognized, they are found mainly in state constitutions. The most farreaching ESR jurisprudence arises from courts considering the right to
education, which all state constitutions guarantee. The framing and judicial interpretation of the right to education has undergone changes over
the years. Between 1971 and 1973, advocates used the federal Equal
1
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tem of common schools throughout the state”. In Rose, the court went
into much more explicit detail about what efficiency re q u i res. It found
that an efficient system of education must aim to endow each child with
seven specific capacities; including knowledge of economic, social and
political systems, strong communications skills, and sufficient training in
academic or vocational fields to choose and pursue his or her life work
intelligently.
Like its Texas counterpart, the Kentucky court did not require the
state legislature to enact any specific legislation, such as raising taxes. Its
instructions were neve rtheless quite onerous to the General Assembly,
which had to “recreate and re-establish a system of common schools”.
The Assembly quickly passed the Kentucky Education Reform Act of
1990, which resulted in tax legislation that increased re venues by more
than one billion dollars. Re venues for all school districts increased by at
least eight percent and, in some districts, up to twenty-five percent. To
some observers, the Rose decision “constitutes one of the most comprehensive interventions by a state judiciary into the realm of legislative policymaking for education.”
In the decade since Rose, Kentucky schools have steadily improved.
For the first time, Kentucky students in all three grades tested in 2001
matched or exceeded the national average on a basic skills assessment.
The relative success of school reform in Kentucky, as opposed to other
states, is due in large part to effective citizen advocacy groups that not
only laid the groundwork for reform but also monitored implementation
in the succeeding years.
Over a decade after the first adequacy decisions came down in
Texas, Kentucky and other states, education reform advocates won a
major victory in New York. In CFE, New York's Court of Appeals held
that Article 11 of the state constitution entitled all students an “opport unity for a meaningful high school education, one which prepares them to
function productively as civic participants” (emphasis added). This ru ling elaborates on the Court's previous determination that Article 11
requires a “sound basic education”. It also reinstates most of the trial
c o u rt's decision holding that the current system of school funding is
unconstitutional.
During the seven-month trial, Justice DeGrasse of the trial court
evaluated the adequacy of New York City public school education by
examining both the resources available, or “inputs”, and measures of student achievement, or “outputs”. Among inputs, the court considere d
whether students benefited from minimally adequate teaching of re asonably up-to-date basic curricula. It looked at evidence of teacher certification, professional development opportunities, and salaries. It also
noted that the schools had poor physical facilities, were ove rcrowded,
and suffered a chronic shortage of books. Among outputs, the court
evaluated evidence of graduation and dropout rates, and student performance on standard i zed tests. The schools performed poorly in both
categories. To establish a causal link between the current funding system
and the poor condition of city schools, the court questioned whether
increased funding could provide New Yo rk City with better teachers,
better school buildings and better technology. Although the requirements of a right to education cannot be gauged by funds alone, the
c o u rt found as a matter of fact that additional financial resources we re
required to address the crisis.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's analysis and gave
the State approximately one year to reform its public school system by
achieving the following objectives: ascertaining the costs of reforming the
public school system, providing public schools with necessary resources,
and establishing a system of accountability to ensure the effective use of
these resources, particularly financial resources.
In the area of education, these cases demonstrate courts' willingness

to develop detailed tools to assess a state's compliance with its constitutional mandates. The standards they prescribe exceed the “core minimum” content required under international law. Articles 13 and 14 of
the ICESCR stipulate that primary education shall be compulsory and
available free to all. Secondary education “shall be made generally ava i lable and accessible to all by eve ry appropriate means.” In addition, the
“material condition of teaching staff” must also continuously improve.
The Rose and CFE decisions demand even more by enumerating specific skills students need to pursue economically productive and politically
engaged lives.

OTHER ESR RIGHTS: SOCIAL ASSISTANCE AND SHELTER
While many courts have recognized a robust right to education
arising from state constitutional language, other social and economic
rights have received far less extensive attention. Howe ve r, there are a few
outstanding examples that demonstrate the promise of a state constitutional approach, especially with respect to we l f a re assistance and housing.
In Tucker v. Toia, the New Yo rk Court of Appeals made a broad interpretation of Article XVII of the New York Constitution: “the aid, care and
s u p p o rt of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the
state and by such of its subdivisions . . . as the legislature may . . . determine.” It found that the language imposed “a positive duty upon the
state” to provide welfare payments to anyone considered indigent under
the state's need standard even if they could not present papers proving
that they received no support from relatives.
Another well-known New York case, Callahan v. Care y, relied on
A rticle XVII of the state constitution to challenge the city's inadequate
emergency shelter system. In this case, the National Coalition for the
Homeless filed a class-action suit on behalf of homeless men in
Manhattan, relying on various provisions of the New York Constitution
and other state and municipal laws to demand that the city to provide
shelter to any man who requested it. The brief cited legislative history
f rom the 1938 New York constitutional convention to argue that the language in Article XVII was intended to confer rights to those “who must
look to society for the bare necessities of life”.
After difficult negotiations, plaintiffs and defendants entered into a
consent decree requiring New York City to furnish sufficient beds for
e ve ry homeless man applying for shelter determined to meet certain
needs criteria. The consent decree mandated, among other things, a minimum of three feet between beds, and one toilet for eve ry six residents.
These standards demonstrate courts' capacity to fashion remedies
addressing complicated social issues. Other courts have recognized a right
to shelter based on “general we l f a re” provisions of their state constitutions
as well as state and local statutes. In 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that a zoning ordinance in Mount Laurel township violated the constitutional re q u i rement that the state's police power promote “public
health, safety, morals or the general welfare”. Because the land use controls excluded low- and moderate-income families from the municipality, they were deemed invalid. The court stated that “[t]here cannot be the
slightest doubt that shelter, along with food, are the most basic human
needs”, and that it was beyond dispute that adequate housing is “ an
absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare required in all local
land use regulations.” The court imposed an obligation on eve ry deve loping municipality to provide a realistic opportunity for “decent and adequate low and moderate income housing”. Unfortunately, the court
failed to provide any guidance about how to fulfill this mandate. Instead,
it granted the township 90 days to reform its land use regulations. For
nearly ten years Mount Laurel and the other municipalities affected did
v i rtually nothing to comply with the judgment.
In 1983 six cases stemming from the above decisions were consoli2

dated in the New Jersey Supreme Court as “Mount Laurel II”. In his
opinion, Chief Justice Wiletz declared that without more forceful judicial intervention, “Mount Laurel will not result in housing, but in paper,
process, witnesses, trials and appeals.” It was time, he wrote, to “put some
steel into the doctrine”. Providing a “realistic opport u n i t y” for the production of low and moderate income housing meant more than eliminating exclusionary zoning regulations. Each municipality was obliged to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, “a likelihood - to the extent
economic conditions allow- that the lower income housing will actually
be constructed.” Faced with heavy pressure to respond to this ruling, in
1995 the New Jersey legislature passed the Fair Housing Act. This Act
codified the doctrine elaborated in the first Mount Laurel case and cre a ted a Council on Affordable Housing to monitor compliance with the
d e c rees. As a result of the Mount Laurel decisions, between 1987 and
1992 the state constructed or rehabilitated approximately 54,000 lowand moderate-income housing units.
While the Callahan and Mount Laurel cases demonstrate the possibility of claiming a right to shelter in U.S. courts, they fall far short of
recognizing a right to adequate housing as defined under international
law. General Comment No. 4, adopted by the ESCR Committee, elaborates seven criteria of housing adequacy. These include: security of
tenure; availability of services, materials, facilities and infrastructure;
affordability; habitability; accessibility; location (access to employment,

a hearing when it attempts to deprive a person of her “life, libert y, or
property”. In the Supreme Court decision Goldberg v. Kelly, the scope of
“property” interests cove red under the clause was expanded to include
welfare payments. The Court explained that since a government benefit
provides an eligible recipient with “the very means by which to live,” the
government may not impair that recipient's interest arbitrarily. The same
analysis was applied in the Washington D.C. shelter case Williams v.
Ba r ry. There, the court held that the city must afford procedural pro t e ctions before cutting off funds to support shelters for homeless males.
Although no right to shelter exists independently in the jurisdiction, the
city had “c h a rted a course of deliberate, consistent action that solidified
and expanded the homeless person program.” Its beneficiaries could
therefore claim a legal interest in continued use of those services.

CONCLUSION
DESPITE EFFORTS BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT to restrict the re c o gnition of ESR, advocates have advanced successful claims using a range
of tools, from non-discrimination statutes to specific constitutional language. The decisions described above demonstrate that ESR are justiciable. They affirm a court's capacity to assess the availability of resources,
to balance competing demands on those resources, and to monitor the
adequacy of complex social policies. However, they also re veal areas that
fall short of human rights standards. As ESR practitioners recognize, creative strategies and solutions drawn from different domestic contexts are
re q u i red to better re d ress such discrepancies.
Jessica Schultz is the Protection Advisor for Oxfam GB in the Mano River Region in
West Africa.

A woman rests during a protest for adequate housing in the United States.
Credit: Ha rvey Finkle

health care, schools, etc.); and cultural adequacy. Although a government
does not need to provide free housing to eve ryone, it has an obligation to
prioritize its policies to benefit the most vulnerable and disadvantaged.
While the Callahan targets such a group - the homeless- it does not
address whether the remedies provided are adequate to meet its needs.
Some aspects of adequacy, like security of tenure and accessibility, are
covered separately by federal, state and local statutes.

NON-REGRESSION OF ESR AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
THE EDUCATION, WELFARE AND SHELTER CASES described are re presentative of courts' attempts to elaborate the substance of state constitutional rights. “Progressive realization”, as noted above, re q u i res a government to fulfill ESR to the maximum of available resources. The principle of “non-retrogression”, in contrast, provides that there can be no
degradation of rights already realized. The Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment is one tool for resisting encroachment upon existing
ESR. It demands that the government provide protections like notice and
3

